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DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS INCOME AND
THE BANKRUPTCY TAX ACT OF 1980:*
AN ECONOMIC BENEFIT APPROACH
INTRODUCTION

In 1931, in United States v. Kirby Lumber Co.,' the Supreme

Court adopted the general rule that discharge of indebtedness 2 for less
* Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-589, § 2(a), (b), 94 Stat. 3389,
3389-96 (1980) (codified at 26 U.S.C.S. §§ 108, 1017 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1981)).
Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 through the date of amendment by the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980.
1. 284 U.S. 1 (1931).
2. Transactions constituting a discharge include the purchase of bonds by a
debtor, United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1931); Commissioner v.
Pittsburgh & W.V. Ry., 172 F.2d 1010, 1012 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 939
(1949); Blake v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 546, 556 (1947), acq. 1947-2 C.B. 1; Montana, W. & S.R.R. v. Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 62, 63 (1934), afj'd per curiam, 77
F.2d 1007 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 604 (1935); Woodward Iron Co. v.
Commissioner, 24 B.T.A. 1050, 1052 (1931); see Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S.
28, 38 (1949); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12(a) (1957); id. § 1.61-12(c)(3), T.D. 6984, 1969-1
C.B. 38, the running of the statute of limitations, Schweppe v. Commissioner, 168
F.2d 284, 284 (9th Cir. 1948) (per curiam); Securities Co. v. United States, 85 F.
Supp. 532, 532-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); Miller Trust v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 191,
195-99 (1981); Estate of Bankhead v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 535, 540 (1973); but
see Callan Court Co. v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1419, 1430-31 (1965)
(statute of limitations not controlling; gain realized the year the debt was written
off), or an agreement to discharge the debt. Capitol Coal v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d
361, 362-63 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 936 (1958); see United States v.
Ingalls, 399 F.2d 143, 146-47 (5th Cir 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1094 (1969);
Wener v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 938, 943 (9th Cir. 1957). But see Walker v,
Commissioner, 88 F.2d 170, 171 (5th Cir.) (agreement of future discharge does not
trigger realization of income), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 692 (1937). The discharge must
be clearly shown. See Hyde v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 300, 307 (1975), acq. in part
1980-1 C.B. 1; Meyers v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 1535, 1536 (1968), afJ'd
per curiam, 435 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 957 (1971). Substitution of one creditor for another, however, does not constitute a discharge. Bittker &
Thompson, Income from the Discharge of Indebtedness: The Progeny of United
States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 66 Calif. L. Rev. 1159, 1171 (1978). Until recently,
acquisition of the debt by a related third party was not a discharge. See Peter Pan
Seafoods, Inc. v. United States, 417 F.2d 670, 673-74 (9th Cir. 1969); Cooper v.
Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 760, 770 (1978); Forrester v. Commissioner, 4
T.C. 907, 920-21 (1945), acq. 1945-1 C.B. 3. But see American Packing & Provision
Co. v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 340, 344-46 (1937) (income realized when bonds
were purchased by subsidiary); Rev. Rul. 61-96, 1961-1 C.B. 68, 69-70 (same). This
allowed a friendly third party to acquire the debtor's obligations, without the debtor
realizing income, and to transfer back the debt when the tax consequences were less
burdensome for the debtor. Bittker & Thompson, supra, at 1173-74. Acquisition by
related third parties is now a discharge. I.R.C. § 108(e)(4)(A). Related parties
include members of the debtor's family, one of a group of controlled corporations, a
trade or business under common control, or a controlling partnership. See id.
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than the full amount of the debt may cause a taxpayer to realize

income.3 Section 61(a)(12) of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) only
provides that income realized from discharge of a debt is recognized

immediately, 4 and sections 108 and 1017,- before amendment by the
Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980 (Act), 6 only provided for an exception to
immediate recognition.7 Until passage of the Act, therefore, the
Code did not provide any guidance for determining when income is
realized from a discharge of indebtedness." Most decisions follow
Kirby. 9 Because of the lack of detailed guidelines for determining

3. 284 U.S. at 3. Initially, courts were reluctant to recognize the principle of
discharge of indebtedness income. See Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U.S.
170, 175 (1926); Burnet v. John F. Campbell Co., 50 F.2d 487, 488 (D.C. Cir. 1931):
Commissioner v. Simmons Gin Co., 43 F.2d 327, 328-29 (10th Cir. 1930); American
Tobacco Co. v. Commissioner, 20 B.T.A. 586, 588 (1930), nonacq. X-I C.B. 73
(1931); Meyer Jewelry Co. v. Commissioner, 3 B.T.A. 1319, 13,2-23 (1926). The
courts' early reluctance to accept realization of discharge of indebtedness income
stems from the Supreme Court's definition of income as "'the gain derived from
capital, from labor, or from both combined." Eisner v. Macomber, 2052 U.S. 189, 207
(1920) (quoting Stratton's Independence, Ltd. v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 231
U.S. 399, 415 (1913)). See Kerbaugh-Empire Co. v. Bowers, 300 F. 938, 942,
(S.D.N.Y. 1924), aff'd, 271 U.S. 170 (1926).
4. Under the Code, gains are normally included in the taxpayer's gross income
in the year that the gain is realized. The Code provides for nonrecognition of gains
under certain circumstances, however, so that the tax consequences are deferred.
See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 351(a), 354(a), 1031(a), 1032 (a), 1035(a), 1036(a). Additionally,
it is possible that a gain that has been realized will be excluded from all tax consequences under the Code. See, e.g., id. §§ 102(a), 118(a).
5. I.R.C. §§ 108, 1017 (1976) (amended 1980).
6. Pub. L. No. 96-589, § 2(a), (b), 94 Stat. 3389, 3389-96 (codified at I.R.C. §§
108, 1017).
7. I.R.C. §§ 108, 1017 (1976) (amended 1980).
8. Stone, Cancellationof Indebtedness, 1 N.Y.U. 34th Inst. on Fed. Tax'n 555,
555-56 (1976). Section 61 only provides that gross income includes "[i]ncome from
discharge of indebtedness." I.R.C. § 61(a)(12). The treasury regulations under § 61,
although more comprehensive, have proved incomplete. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12
(1968); Stone, supra, at 555 & n.1, 556. Sections 108 and 1017, prior to amendment
in 1980, permitted deferment of ordinary income treatment of discharge of indebtedness income if certain requirements were satisfied. Neither section specified rules for
realization of discharge income from different types of debt discharge, id., even
though detailed rules on discharge of indebtedness had been proposed in 1954 by the
House of Representatives. H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13, A28-29,
A35, A267, reprintedin 1954 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4025, 4036-38, 4164-65,
4171-72, 4409. The Senate rejected the proposed rules, leaving the law "'tobe settled
according to rules developed by the courts." S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
14, reprinted in 1954 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4629, 4643.
9. E.g., Helvering v. American Chicle Co., 291 U.S. 426, 430 (1934); Denman
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 261, 263 (6th Cir. 1951): Commissioner v. Stanley Co. of Am., 185 F.2d 979, 980-82 (2d Cir. 1951); Montana, W. &
S.R.R. v. Commissioner, 77 F.2d 1007, 1007-08 (3d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied,
296 U.S. 604 (1935); Commissioner v. Coastwvise Transp. Corp., 62 F.2d 332, 334
(1st Cir. 1932); Twin Ports Bridge Co. v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 346, 355, 357
(1932).
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when income is realized from discharging indebtedness, however,
judicial exceptions to the Kirby rule based on policy grounds have
been created.' 0 The Act is intended to eliminate some of these exceptions, and to effectuate congressional intent merely to defer taxation
of income realized from debt discharge.l"

The Act substantially expands Code section 10812 to establish certain rules for determining whether a specific discharge produces in10. E.g., Helvering v. American Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322, 330-31 (1943) (gifts);
United States v. Hall, 307 F.2d 238, 241-42 (10th Cir. 1962) (compromise of disputed
liability); Commissioner v. Capento Sec. Corp., 140 F.2d 382, 386 (1st Cir. 1944)
(stock for debt transfer); Corporacion de Ventas de Salitre y Yoda de Chile v.
Commissioner, 130 F.2d 141, 143-44 (2d Cir. 1942) (contingent obligations);
Helvering v. A.L. Killian Co., 128 F.2d 433, 434 (8th Cir. 1942) (purchase money
obligations); Commissioner v. Mesta, 123 F.2d 986, 988 (3d Cir.) (property for debt
transfer), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 695 (1941); Helvering v. Jane Holding Corp., 109
F.2d 933, 938-39 (8th Cir.) (contributions to capital), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 653
(1940); Dallas Transfer & Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Commissioner, 70 F.2d 95, 96
(5th Cir. 1934) (insolvent debtor); Collins v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 1467,
1471 (1963) (nonrecourse obligations); Barnhart-Morrow Consol. v. Commissioner,
47 B.T.A. 590, 600-01 (1942) (insolvent debtor), acq. 1944-1 C.B. 3, aff'd, 150 F.2d
285 (9th Cir. 1945); see Bittker & Thompson, supra note 2, at 1166; Eustice,
Cancellation of Indebtedness and the Federal Income Tax: A Problem of Creeping
Confusion, 14 Tax L. Rev. 225, 225 (1959); Stone, supra note 8, at 556; Wright,
Realization of Income Through Cancellations,Modifications, and BargainPurchases
of Indebtedness (pts. I-I), 49 Mich. L. Rev. 459, 460, 667, 698 (1951); Note, A
Review of Judicial Exceptions to the Kirby Lumber Rule, 30 U. Fla. L. Rev. 94,
94-95 (1977). These exceptions also may have been caused by judicial reluctance to
tax debtors in financial trouble. See Bittker & Thompson, supra note 2, at 1160. The
insolvency exception is the most evident example of this reluctance. See Eustice,
supra, at 246-47. The insolvency exception excluded discharge of indebtedness income income if the debtor was insolvent before and after the discharge. Dallas
Transfer & Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Commissioner, 70 F.2d 95, 96 (5th Cir.
1934); Astoria Marine Constr. Co. v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 798, 800-01 (1949);
Main Properties v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 364, 383-85 (1944), acq. 1945-1 C.B. 5;
Kramon Dev. Co. v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 342, 349 (1944), acq. 1944-1 C.B. 17;
Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12(b)(1) (1957); Rev. Rul. 58-600, 1958-2 C.B. 29, 30. Discharge
of indebtedness resulted only to the extent the debtor was made solvent. Haden Co.
v. Commissioner, 118 F.2d 285, 286 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 622 (1941);
Texas Gas Distrib. Co. v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 57, 61-62 (1944), acq. 1944-1 C.B.
27; Lakeland Grocery Co. v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 289, 291-92 (1937). But see
Fifth Avenue-Fourteenth St. Corp. v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 453, 457 (2d Cir.
1945) (insolvent debtor realized taxable income only to the extent the creditor would
have recovered income after liquidation of the debtor). Paradoxically, although a
discharge of indebtedness of an insolvent taxpayer outside of bankruptcy did not
require the debtor to reduce the basis of retained property, a discharge of indebtedness in bankruptcy did. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1016-7 to -8 (1957). The Bankruptcy Tax
Act of 1980 has abolished the insolvency exclusion. Pub. L. No. 96-589, § 2(a), 94
Stat. 3392 (codified at I.R.C. § 108(e)(1)).
11. S. Rep. No. 1035, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1980), reprinted in 1981 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 11,329, 11,337-38 [hereinafter cited as Senate Report]; see

I.R.C. § 108(e).
12. I.R.C. § 108, amended by Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-589,
§ 2(a), 94 Stat. 3389 (1980). The Act also rewrote § 1017. I.R.C. § 1017, amended by
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come, 13 and to permit special tax treatment other than nonrecogni-

tion.14 Prior to the Act, income realized from a discharge was either
recognized or nonrecognized.'

5

The Act adds a third possible tax

consequence involving the reduction of what are labelled "tax attributes" by the income realized from a debt discharge.' 6 The tax attrib-

utes, in their order of reduction, are: (1) net operating losses; (2)
certain tax credit carryovers; (3) capital loss carryovers; (4) bases of
property; and (5) foreign tax credit carryovers. 7
The tax consequences accorded discharge of indebtedness income

under section 10818 depend upon the financial status of the taxpayer. 9 A solvent taxpayer recognizes ordinary income,20 or, in a
business context, can elect nonrecognition of income 2 ' by reducing the

Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-589, § 2(b), 94 Stat. 3394 (1980).
Section 1017 is the discharge of indebtedness income nonrecognition section of the
Code. To the extent allowed by the rules of § 108, income may be applied to reduce
bases of property held by the taxpayer pursuant to the rules of § 1017, in lieu of
immediate recognition of ordinary income.
13. See I.R.C. § 108(e).
14. See id. § 108(b).
15. See id. § 61(a)(12); I.R.C. §§ 108, 1017 (1976) (amended 1980); supra note 8.
16. I.R.C. § 108(b).
17. Id.
18. Section 108 provides the tax treatment of discharge of indebtedness income if
the income is realized either in bankruptcy or when the taxpayer is insolvent. Id.
§ 108(a)(1), (b); see infra notes 25-29 and accompanying text. A solvent taxpayer can
elect § 108 tax treatment. Senate Report, supra note 11, at 15-16, reprinted in 1981
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 11,342-43; see I.R.C § 108(a)(1)(C), (c), (d)(4);
infra notes 20-24 and accompanying text. Discharges of a bankrupt debtor will not be
distinguished in this Note from discharges of an insolvent debtor.
19. See I.R.C. § 108(a), (b)(1). For a general discussion of § 108, see Ruge, Tax
Treatment of Discharge of Indebtedness-Bankrupt, Insolvent and Solvent Debtors
(pt.1), 2 N.Y.U. 39th Inst. on Fed. Tax'n 40-1, 40-19 to 40-24 (1981); Sheinfield &
Caldwell, Taxes: An Analysis of the Tax Provisions of the Bankruptcy Tax Act of
1980, 55 Bankr. L.J. 97, 111-14 (1981).
20. Senate Report, supra note 11, at 15-16, reprintedin 1981 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 11,342-43.
21. I.R.C. § 108(c), (d)(4). The discharged indebtedness to which such an election applies is called qualified business indebtedness, and this election is available to
corporations or individuals involved in a trade or business. Id. § 108(d)(4); Temporary Treas. Reg. § 7a.1(c)(2) (1981). Whether an individual is involved in a trade or
business is a question of fact. Treas. Reg. § 1.108(a)-l(a)(2) (1956). The debt can be
qualified business indebtedness if used to purchase, improve, or repair property used
in the taxpayer's trade or business, but not merely when the collateral for the
indebtedness was used in the trade or business. Id.; see Rev. Rul. 76-86, 1976-1 C.B.
37, 38 (inventory is property used in a trade or business). Electing to treat the
discharged debt as qualified business indebtedness allows the taxpayer to reduce
bases in depreciable property rather than recognize ordinary income. I.R.C.
§ 108(c)(1)(A); see Senate Report, supra note 11, at 15-16, reprinted in 1981 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News at 11,342-43.
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bases of depreciable property. 22 If the taxpayer does not have enough

basis to absorb all of the income, the excess is recognized immedi-

ately; 2 3 the solvent taxpayer does not have the option of reducing tax

attributes.2 4 An insolvent taxpayer, however, never recognizes ordinary income.2 5 Such a taxpayer is required to reduce tax attributes by
the discharge of indebtedness income, 2 unless he elects to reduce
bases in depreciable property2 7 in lieu of reducing tax attributes.2

8

22. I.R.C. § 108(c); see supra note 21. Property is depreciable if covered by
§ 167, and the reduced basis decreases the permissible depreciation deduction. I.R.C.
§§ 167, 1017(b)(3)(B); see id. § 108(d)(5). See generally Kem v. Commissioner, 51
T.C. 455, 460-62 (1968) (owner not allowed depreciation deductions on herd of
cattle during period of lease), aff'd, 432 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1970).
23. Senate Report, supra note 11, at 16, reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 11,343; see I.R.C. § 108(c)(2).
24. See I.R.C. § 108(b)(1); Senate Report, supra note 11, at 15-16, reprinted In
1981 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 11,342-43.
25. See I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(B). This rule applies only to the extent the taxpayer Is
insolvent immediately prior to the discharge. Id. § 108(d)(3); Senate Report, supra
note 11, at 15, reprintedin 1981 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 11,342. Congress
defined insolvency as an "excess of liabilities over the fair market value of assets."
I.R.C. § 108(d)(3). Although property exempt from claims of creditors is not included in the fair market value of the taxpayer's assets, Cole v. Commissioner, 42
B.T.A. 1110, 1113 (1940), nonacq. 1941-1 C.B. 13, intangible assets, such as goodwill, can be. See, e.g., J.A. Maurer, Inc. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 1273, 1291-92
(1958), acq. 1959-1 C.B. 4; Conestoga Transp. Co. v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 506,
514-15 (1951), acq. 1952-1 C.B. 2. But see Davis v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 814, 834
(1978) (business expertise and established business relationships not included). For
example, if a corporate taxpayer repurchased bonds issued at $100,000 for $25,000
cash, discharge of indebtedness income would be $75,000. If, before the discharge,
the taxpayer had assets of $125,000 and liabilities of $200,000, the amount by which
the taxpayer is insolvent is $75,000 and the $75,000 income will not be recognized.
If, however, the amount by which the taxpayer is insolvent is only $50,000, $50,000
will not be recognized because of insolvency, and $25,000 will be ordinary income,
or nonrecognized because of the qualified business indebtedness election. See Senate
Report, supra note 11, at 15-16, reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at
11,342-43; supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text. In this situation, the creditor
would ordinarily have long term capital gain or loss, see I.R.C. § 1232(a), although
the debtor's income is ordinary if recognized. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(12); Eustice, supra
note 10, at 232.
26. I.R.C. § 108(b). Discharge of indebtedness income must reduce, in order, the
tax attributes of: (1) net operating loss and its carryovers; (2) certain credit carryovers; (3) net capital loss and its carryovers; (4) the bases for depreciable and
nondepreciable property; and (5) foreign tax credit carryovers. Id. The reductions In
(1), (3), and (4) are dollar for dollar; the reductions in (2) and (5) are one for two. Id.
§ 108(b)(3). The reduction in (4) cannot exceed the aggregate bases of the property,
less the aggregate liabilities. Id. § 1017(b)(2). This limitation does not apply when
the taxpayer elects to reduce bases of depreciable property before reducing tax
attributes. Id.
27. This election applies only to the extent of the taxpayer's bases in depreciable
property. I.R.C § 108(b)(5)(B). The income that exceeds these bases must be applied
to reduce tax attributes. Temporary Treas. Reg. § 7a.l(c)(1)(i) (1981); Senate Re-
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Any discharge of indebtedness income that remains after all tax attributes have been reduced is disregarded. 29
Section 108 does not respond to all issues which arise when a
determination must be made whether discharge of indebtedness income is realized. 30 It neither adequately defines indebtedness 3 nor
reflects an adequate theoretical basis for realization of income.32
Lacking guidance, courts have variously focused on the nature of the
debt, the solvency of the debtor, the existence of a prior tax benefit to
the debtor, the nature of the property transferred to effect the dis-

port, supra note 11, at 13, reprintedin 1981 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 11,340.
For the purposes of this election or the election by a solvent debtor for nonrecognition
treatment, see supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text, the debtor may increase
available depreciable property in three ways. First, real property held as inventory
for sale may be treated as depreciable property. I.R.C. § 1017(b)(3)(E). Second,
stock in a subsidiary may be treated as depreciable property if the subsidiary reduces
basis in its property and the parent and subsidiary file a consolidated return. Id.
§ 1017(b)(3)(D). This rule can apply through a chain of subsidiaries. Senate Report,
supra note 11, at 15-16, reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 11,34243. Third, the taxpayer may acquire additional depreciable assets. See I.R.C.
§§ 108(b)(3)(B), (c)(2), 1017(a)(2) (period between cancellation and point of reducing bases during which taxpayer could acquire assets).
28. I.R.C. § 108(b)(5). The tax consequences of reducing tax attributes or depreciable property differ. Carryover expiration dates, whether carryovers should be
preserved, and whether and how much income remains after reducing tax attributes
should all be weighed by taxpayers. A taxpayer with few tax attributes would be
foolish to elect to reduce bases of depreciable property. When the taxpayer elects to
reduce bases the recognition of income is only postponed. Bittker & Thompson, supra
note 2, at 1185. When the basis of property is reduced, depreciation deductions
decrease and the gain from a sale increases. Id. Moreover, the amount that reduces
the basis of property might have to be recaptured as ordinary income. I.R.C.
§ 1017(d). The Treasury Department is expected to issue regulations to set the order
in which the taxpayer must reduce bases of assets under § 1017(b)(1), similar to
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1017-1,-2 (1956). Senate Report, supra note 11, at 15, reprinted in
1981 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 11,343. Because reduction of basis is not a
disposition, I.R.C. § 1017(c)(2), the taxpayer need not recapture investment credits.
Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 654 F.2d 35, 44 (Ct. Cl. 1981)
(taxpayer was entitled to its full investment credit despite the election to defer
recognition of discharge of indebtedness income); Senate Report, supra note 11, at
20, reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 11,347. Contra Treas. Reg.
§ 1.47-2(c) (1967) (basis reduction causes recapture); Rev. Rul. 74-184, 1974-1 C.B.
8 (recapture required under §§ 108 and 1017 (1976) (amended 1980)).
29. Senate Report, supra note 11, at 13, reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 11,340; see I.R.C. § 108(a)(1), (b)(1).
30. See I.R.C. § 108(a)(1).
31. See id. § 108(d)(1)(A), (B) (any indebtedness liability or an encumbrance on
the taxpayer's property). The regulations under the pre-amendment section 108,
however, define indebtedness as "an obligation, absolute. . . to pay on demand or
within a given time, in cash or another medium, a fixed amount." Treas. Reg.
§ 1.108(b)-l(c) (1956).
32. See I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(A), (B), (C).
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charge and the intentions of the creditor in accepting less than full
payment as essential elements in determining whether income has
been realized. This Note examines these varying approaches and criticizes their results as inconsistent and illogical.3 3 It argues that a more
appropriate basis for determining discharge of indebtedness income is
the untaxed economic benefit received by the debtor. Once it is determined that income has been realized, whether it is recognized, nonrecognized, applied to reduce tax attributes, or excluded from all tax
consequences will depend solely on Code provisions that already reflect policy considerations. With this two-step approach, consequences of discharges will be more certain and consistent.
I. THEORIES UNDERLYING DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS INCOME

A. Economic Benefit Theory
Gross income includes the gain or benefit derived from all
sources.3 4 The central inquiry with respect to whether a taxpayer
should realize income from the discharge of indebtedness, therefore, is
whether the taxpayer received an untaxed economic benefitA5 The
initial economic benefit from borrowing is disregarded because this
benefit is offset by the obligation to repay.36 Taxing the initial benefit would seriously reduce the benefits of borrowing and impair debt
financing. When the assumption of repayment is no longer justified,
however, the initial economic benefit is not offset.3 7 Absent countervailing congressional intent, therefore, the past economic benefit from
borrowing, like other economic benefits, should be taxed.38 In simple
terms, "income results from the discharge of indebtedness because the
taxpayer has received more than is paid back. . .. "3 Admittedly,
33. See Bittker & Thompson, supra note 2, at 1166-84; Eustice, supra note 10, at
231-53; Stone, supra note 8, at 559-73; Wright, supra note 10, at 465-84, 671-94.
34. I.R.C. § 61(a); see id. § 64; Treas. Reg. § 1.61-6(a) (1957).
35. Bittker & Thompson, supra note 2, at 1165-66; Surrey, The Revenue Act of
1939 and the Income Tax Treatment of Cancellation of Indebtedness, 49 Yale L.J.
1153, 1176 (1940); see United States v. Rochelle, 384 F.2d 748, 751 (5th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 946 (1968); W. Andrews, Basic Federal Income Taxation 269
(2d ed. 1979); Eustice, supra note 10, at 225.
36. W. Andrews, supra note 35, at 269; Bittker & Thompson, supra note 2, at
1159, 1166. For a recent discussion concerning the appropriateness of initially excluding borrowed funds from income, see Popkin, The Taxation of Borrowing, 56
Ind. L.J. 43 (1980).
37. Bittker & Thompson, supra note 2, at 1165-66; Eustice, supra note 10, at
288.
38. Bittker & Thompson, supra note 2, at 1165-66; Eustice, supra note 10, at
288; Surrey, supra note 35, at 1176. The rationale for this rule can also be explained
in tax benefit rule terminology. For a discussion of the tax benefit rule, see infra note
74. When the assumption of full repayment proves invalid, the taxpayer should
realize income to rectify the erroneously granted tax benefit.
39. 1 B. Bittker, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts 6.4.1, at 6-31
(1981).
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courts have not accepted the economic benefit theory. 40 Scrutiny of
various fact patterns, however, demonstrates that it is more useful 4'
and logical than the approach currently employed, the freeing of
assets theory.
B. Freeing of Assets Theory

Courts relying on a freeing of assets theory reason that the discharge
from debt for less than the amount owed releases, for the debtor's
general use, assets which were "previously offset by the obligation" to
repay and should, therefore, be taxed under United States v. Kirby
Lumber Co. 42 This theory is not correctly focused and therefore is
not consistently applied. On the one hand, various courts have refused
to apply the theory to require realization of income when a promise to
make a gift is revoked, or when a debt arising out of a tort is released,

40. See infra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
41. Valuation of the initial benefit and the consideration transferred to effect the
discharge is beyond the scope of this Note. Cost, however, is a good starting point for
valuation. See Guggenheim v. Rasquin, 312 U.S. 254, 258 (1941) ("[c]ost is cogent
evidence of value"); St. Louis-S.F. Ry. v. United States, 444 F.2d 1102, 1107 (Ct. Cl.
1971) (consideration paid is better measure of value than face value), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1017 (1972); Fashion Park, Inc. v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 600, 604-06
(1954) (same), nonacq. 1955-1 C.B. 7; Gould v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 414, 416
(1950) ("a sale [price] is regarded as the best evidence of the value of the article
involved"). For a good discussion of the problems inherent in valuing property, see
Cupler v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 946, 954-59 (1975), acq. 1976-1 C.B. 1. Although
applying the economic benefit theory may give rise to valuation problems, such
problems should not be so burdensome as to outweigh the benefits obtained by
correctly applying the theory. Such valuations are encountered in every facet of tax
administration. See, e.g., I.R.C § 84(a) (appreciated property transferred to a political organization); id. § 108(a)(3), (d)(3) (debtor's insolvency); id. § 334(a) (property
received in a partial or complete liquidation); id. § 1001(b) (amount realized from
disposition of property); id. §1015(a) (property acquired by gift); id. §§ 2031(a), (b),
2032(a) (gross estate of a decedent); id. § 2512 (valuation of gifts); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.170A-l(c)(1), (2), (3) (1972) (charitable contributions).
42. 284 U.S. 1, 3 (1931); See Commissioner v. Stanley Co. of Am., 185 F.2d 979,
981 (2d Cir. 1951); Commissioner v. Pittsburgh & W.V. Ry., 172 F.2d 1010, 1012-14
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 939 (1949); Central Paper Co. v. Commissioner, 158
F.2d 131, 133 (6th Cir. 1946); Corporacion de Ventas de Salitre y Yoda de Chile v.
Commissioner, 130 F.2d 141, 143 (2d Cir. 1942); Haden Co. v. Commissioner, 118
F.2d 285, 286 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 622 (1941); Commissioner v. Coastwise Transp. Corp., 71 F.2d 104, 106 (1st Cir. 1934); Dallas Transfer & Terminal
Warehouse Co. v. Commissioner, 70 F.2d 95, 96 (5th Cir. 1934); Miller Trust v.
Commissioner, 76 T.C. 191, 195, 201 (1981); Collins v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1467, 1470-71 (1963); Bialock v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 649, 660-62 (1961),
acq. 1961-2 C.B. 4; Astoria Marine Constr. Co. v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 798, 801
(1949); Kramon Dev. Co. v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 342, 349 (1944), acq. 1944-1
C.B. 17; Texas Gas Distrib. Co. v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 57, 61-62 (1944), acq.
1944-1 C.B. 27; Lakeland Grocery Co. v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 289, 292 (1937);
Bittker & Thompson, supra note 2, at 1165; Eustice, supra note 10, at 228.
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despite the freeing of assets. The rationale is that a taxpayer does not
realize income when assets are freed if no economic benefit was
received by the debtor on creation of the liability. 43 On the other
hand, courts have used the theory to exclude certain discharges, such
as disputed or nonrecourse debt, despite the clear benefit received
when the debt was incurred. It is reasoned that unless assets are freed,
the discharge of such liabilities does not result in the realization of
income. 44 For example, one individual borrowed $15,000 secured by
$100 worth of stock under a nonrecourse note. The Tax Court held
that his discharge of indebtedness income was limited to $100, the
assets freed by the discharge. 45 Accordingly, $14,900 of benefit escaped taxation.
Kirby involved the repurchase by a corporation of its debt obligations for less than par. 46 The Supreme Court reasoned that the
difference between the excess of the amount of the obligation over the
amount paid to retire the obligation "made available" additional
"'assets" to the corporation and, therefore, caused it to "realize" an
"accession to income. ' 47 The thrust of Kirby was to tax economic
benefit. The Court's reference to freeing of assets was for the limited
purpose of distinguishing its prior holding 48 in Bowers v. KerbaughEmpire Co. 49 in which the Court, in its first encounter with discharge

43. See Bradford v. Commissioner, 233 F.2d 935, 937-38 (6th Cir. 1956) (discharge of liability that was assumed without consideration); Ruben v. Commissioner,
97 F.2d 926, 928-29 (8th Cir. 1938) (release from tort claim); Commissioner v. Rail
Joint Co., 61 F.2d 751, 751-52 (2d Cir. 1932) (repurchase at discount of bonds
previously distributed as dividends); C. Ludwig Baumann & Co. v. Commissioner, 2
T.C.M. (CCH) 188, 190 (1943) (discharge of debt that was assumed for cancellation
of a lease); Warren & Sugarman, Cancellation of Indebtedness and its Tax Consequences (pt. 1), 40 Colum. L. Rev. 1326, 1332-33 (1940).
44. Corporacion de Ventas de Salitre y Yoda de Chile v. Commissioner, 130 F.2d
141, 143 (2d Cir. 1942) (contingent obligations); Collins v. Commissioner, 22
T.C.M. (CCH) 1467, 1471 (1963) (nonrecourse obligations); Astoria Marine Constr.
Co. v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 798, 801 (1949) (insolvency); Kramon Dev. Co. v.
Commissioner, 3 T.C. 342, 349 (1944) (same), acq. 1944-1 C.B. 17; Texas Gas
Distrib. Co. v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 57, 61 (1944) (same), acq. 1944-1 C.B. 27;
Lakeland Grocery Co. v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 289, 292 (1937) (same); see
Haden Co. v. Commissioner, 118 F.2d 285, 286 (5th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 314
U.S. 622 (1941); Dallas Transfer & Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Commissioner, 70
F.2d 95, 96 (5th Cir. 1934) (same); N. Sobel, Inc. v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 1263,
1265 (1939) (disputed debt), nonacq. 1940-1 C.B. 8; Bittker & Thompson, supra note
2, at 1165 & n.18.
45. Collins v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 1467, 1471 (1963).
46. 284 U.S. at 2.
47. Id. at 3.
48. See id.
49. 271 U.S. 170 (1926). Kerbaugh was decided five years before the Court
adopted the general rule of discharge of indebtedness income in Kirby.
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of indebtedness, rejected an argument for realization of discharge of
indebtedness income.
The Court in Kerbaugh-Empire examined the net effect of a loan

transaction and held that there was no income because the losses
incurred from unsuccessful business activities, financed with the borrowed funds, exceeded the gain from discharge. 0 The Kerbaugh
doctrine is broader than the economic benefit theory in that it adjusts
for any subsequent loss, or a decline in value of the benefit received. 5
This adjustment is ill-founded because subsequent losses should be
irrelevant to realization of discharge of indebtedness income.52 Consider, for example, a taxpayer who borrows $1,000 to invest in a stock
which subsequently becomes worthless. Under Kerbaugh, the loss of
the $1,000 would offset the $1,000 received on borrowing and thus,
no income would be realized on discharge. This is an incorrect result
because the taxpayer received $1,000 which he was allowed to exclude
from income under the assumption of full repayment and which he
has now realized. Furthermore, the limitations on losses found in
sections 165 and 1211 of the Code5 3 may be frustrated by permitting a
taxpayer to offset losses against discharge of indebtedness income.
Although Kerbaugh has been strongly criticized5 and is given limited application,55 it has never been overruled.56 Kerbaugh is not
only inconsistent with the more logical economic benefit theory,7 it is

50. 271 U.S. at 175.
51. See id. at 172-75; see supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
52. Bittker & Thompson, supra note 2, at 1162-66; Note, Dischargeof Indebtedness and the FederalIncome Tax, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 977, 985 (1940) [hereinafter cited
as Discharge of Indebtedness].
53. See I.R.C. §§ 165, 1211.
54. See Bittker & Thompson, supra note 2, at 1162-66; Wright, supra note 10, at
461-65.
55. The taxpayer must clearly trace the subsequent loss to the borrowed money
to escape realization of income under the Kerbaugh theory. See Commissioner v.
Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 35 n.1, 39 n.4 (1949); Church's English Shoes, Ltd. v.
Commissioner, 229 F.2d 957, 958 (2d Cir. 1956) (per curiam); Willard Helburn, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 214 F.2d 815, 819 (ist Cir. 1954); Capitol Coal Corp. v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 1183, 1194-95 (1956), aff'd, 250 F.2d 361 (2d Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 356 U.S. 936 (1958). This requirement is quite burdensome. See id. (commingled funds make tracing impracticable).
56. See Bradford v. Commissioner, 233 F.2d 935, 938-39 (6th Cir. 1956). Kerbaugh was arguably affirmed sub silentio in Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28,
30 (1949) (leaving open the possibility of tracing losses to offset discharge of indebted-

ness gain).
57. The Kerbaugh theory is an economic benefit theory, but differs from the
economic benefit theory as proposed in this Note. Under Kerbaugh, the economic
benefit received as a result of borrowing is valued as of the time of the discharge. The
economic benefit should be the value as of the time of borrowing. It is this value
which is excluded from income because of the assumption of full payment. See supra
notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
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also inconsistent with the Supreme Court's position that the government can compute income on an annual basis. 8 If Kerbaugh is
utilized in a particular fact pattern, an adjustment should be made for
tax benefits derived from the subsequent loss, such as deductions for
business losses.5 9
II. TYPE OF DEBT DiscHAIrF_
The economic benefit theory compares the value of the benefit

received by the debtor as a result of borrowing with the value of the
consideration transferred to discharge the obligation. 0 The nature of
the debt discharged is irrelevant to determinations made under this
theory. Many courts, however, have looked to the nature of the
discharged debt. Focusing on this inquiry permits economic benefits
to remain untaxed and may frustrate congressional intent.
A. Less Than Absolute Liability
Because courts focus on the freeing of assets, an initial question has
been whether assets were encumbered by the obligation to repay.
Whether this obligation is absolute has therefore affected the determination of discharge of indebtedness income. Some courts hold that
disputed indebtedness does not encumber assets and, therefore, discharge of indebtedness income is not realized from the compromise
discharge of such indebtedness. 61 In effect, the initial economic bene-

58. Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359, 364 (1931). "A taxpayer may
be in receipt of net income in one year and not in another. The net result of the two

years, if combined in a single taxable period, might still be a loss; but It has never
been supposed that that fact would relieve him from a tax on the first [year's
income].
... Id. at 364-65. Under the proposed economic benefit theory, the
taxpayer in the example in the text would realize income from the discharge of
indebtedness in the year of discharge, and capital loss for the worthless security In the
year of worthlessness. See I.R.C. § 165(g).
59. Bittker & Thompson, supra note 2, at 1163; Dischargeof Indebtedness, supra
note 52, at 985; see I.R.C. § 165(a), (c). Otherwise the taxpayer may receive a double
tax benefit: first, a deduction under the applicable code section; and, second, an
offset against discharge of indebtedness income.
60. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
61. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 307 F.2d 238, 240-41 (10th Cir. 1962);
Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Lucas, 11 F. Supp. 537, 539 (W.D. Ky. 1935),
aff'd on other grounds, 89 F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1937); N. Sobel, Inc. v. Commissioner,
40 B.T.A. 1263, 1265 (1939), nonacq. 1940-1 C.B. 8. But cf. Standard Brass & Mfg.
Co. v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 371, 375-76 (1953) (compromise discharge of indebtedness for accrued and previously deducted royalties resulted in income), afJ'd per
curiam, 218 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1955); Commercial Elec. Supply Co. v. Commissioner, 8 B.T.A. 986, 991-92 (1927) (settlement of legal dispute gave rise to income).
Some commentators support this result because of the difficulty of measuring the
debt discharged. See Blattner, Debt Cancellation, 1 N.Y.U. 30th Inst. on Fed. Tax'n
237, 253 (1972); Eustice, supra note 10, at 237; Wright, supra note 10, at 680.
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fit is excluded because of the assumption of repayment, and when that

assumption proves erroneous, the discharge of indebtedness income is
excluded because the indebtedness is disputed. If the debtor has in fact

received an untaxed economic benefit, 62 however, this benefit should
be taxed. Furthermore, this exception is susceptible to abuse. It per-

mits the use of a self-serving dispute to avoid taxation
despite receipt
63
by the debtor of a clear initial economic benefit.

Under the freeing of assets theory, discharge of contingent obliga-

tions also may not result in income. 64 For example, the Tax Court has

held that a debtor did not realize income from a discharge because,
under terms of the loan agreement, the debtor and the creditor could
rescind the indebtedness at any time, and consequently, the debtor

had no assets tied up by the debt.6 5 This result, however, ignores an

economic benefit that was initially excluded from gross income because of the assumption that the loan would be repaid in full. Applying the economic benefit theory would prevent this result.

Similarly, release from a nonrecourse

debt 67

6

may not result in

discharge of indebtedness income. The Tax Court has held that the

income realized on the discharge of such debt is limited to the value of

the collateral pledged, 68 rather than the value of the initial benefit
received as a result of borrowing.69 A contrary result occurs, how-

ever, when the value of the loan comprises part of the adjusted basis
of the collateral transferred to discharge the obligation.70 In this
situation, the Tax Court treats the discharge as a sale or exchange

subject to capital gains treatment, and measures the gain as the difference between the amount due on the debt, presumably the measure of

the economic benefit received but not yet repaid, and the adjusted

62. For a discussion of the measurement problems that this might entail, see
supra note 41.
63. See N. Sobel, Inc. v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 1263, 1265 (1939), nonacq.
1940-1 C.B. 8.
64. Corporacion de Ventas de Salitre y Yoda de Chile v. Commissioner, 130 F.2d
141, 143 (2d Cir. 1942); Main Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 364, 379
(1944), acq. 1945-1 C.B. 5; Terminal Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 1004,
1013-15 (1943), acq. 1944-1 C.B. 27.
65. Main Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 364, 379-80 (1944) (stock that
had become worthless exchanged for note), acq. 1945-1 C.B. 5.
66. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
67. A debtor is not personally liable for a nonrecourse debt. Simmons, Nonrecourse Debt and Amount Realized: The Demise of Crane's Footnote 37, 59 Or. L.
Rev. 3, 3 (1980). A creditor can only forelose on the security for the loan. See Millar
v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 212, 213-15 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978).
68. Collins v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 1467, 1471 (1963) ($100 income
on the forgiveness of a $15,000 nonrecourse loan secured by stock worth only $100).
69. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
70. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947), requires that a purchase money
obligation be reflected in the purchaser's adjusted basis of the property. Id. at 6-11.
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basis of the collateral transferred. 7' No rationale is offered for the
two different results. The correct measure of the debtor's income
should not depend on whether the basis of the collateral includes the
nonrecourse loan amount. Because Congress specifically included
nonrecourse debt within the definition of indebtedness in section
108,72 nonrecourse debt should be included under general discharge of
indebtedness rules, which should focus on whether the debtor has
fully repaid any initial untaxed benefit received on borrowing.73
B. Non-principal Debt
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Commissioner) and the
courts also exclude from discharge of indebtedness income non-principal debt that failed to produce a prior tax benefit.7 1 In other words,

71. Estate of Delman v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 15, 28 (1979); Millar v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 656, 660 (1977), aff'd, 577 F.2d 212, 214-16 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978). Contra Tufts v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1058, 1063
(5th Cir. 1981), rev'g 70 T.C. 756, 763-66 (1978). See generally infra notes 117-124
and accompanying text (transfer of property to discharge a debt). For a good discussion of Crane, Millar and Tufts, see Simmons, Nonrecourse Debt and Amount
Realized: The Demise of Crane's Footnote 37, 59 Or. L, Rev. 3 (1980).
72. I.R.C. § 108(d)(1)(B).
73. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
74. E.g., Barnhart-Morrow Consol. v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 590, 600-01
(1942), acq. 1944-1 C.B. 3, aff'd, 150 F.2d 285 (9th Cir. 1945); Rev. Rul. 67-200,
1967-1 C.B. 15, clarified, Rev. Rul. 70-406, 1970-2 C.B. 16; Private Letter Ruling
7845004 (July 27, 1978); see Rev. Rul. 76-316, 1976-2 C.B. 22 (superceding Rev. Rul.
73-432, 1973-2 C.B. 17) (extends to relations between a corporation and its subsidiary). This is the same result that is obtained under the tax benefit rule. Under the tax
benefit rule if a taxpayer has derived a tax benefit from a deduction in a previous
year, the subsequent recovery of that item results in the realization of income. 34
Am. Jur. 2d Fed. Tax § 5250 (1981). Thus, if the prior deduction did not produce a
tax benefit, the subsequent cancellation of the liability would not result in income
under the tax benefit rule. See Bittker & Kanner, The Tax Benefit Rule, 26 U.C.L.A.
L. Rev. 265, 265-66, 273 (1978); O'Hare, Statutory Nonrecognition of Income and
the OverridingPrincipleof the Tax Benefit Rule in the Taxation of Corporations and
Shareholders, 27 Tax L. Rev. 215, 215, 240-44 (1972); Plumb, The Tax Benefit Rule
Today, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 130, 140-44 (1943). Congress has expressly recognized
the tax benefit rule as applied to bad debts, prior taxes, and delinquency amounts.
I.R.C. § 111; see Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 199 F.2d 657, 659 (5th
Cir. 1952) (bad debts); Union Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 111 F.2d 60, 61 (7th Cir.)
(taxes), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 658 (1940). The Regulations extend the rule to "all
other losses, expenditures, and accruals." Treas. Reg. § 1.111-1(a) (1956); see Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 641 F.2d 529, 530-31 (7th Cir. 1981) (refunds);
Mayfair Minerals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 456 F.2d 622, 623 (5th Cir. 1972) (per
curiam) (refunds);' Bear Mfg. Co. v. United States, 430 F.2d 152, 154 (7th Cir. 1970)
(contract liability), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1021 (1971); Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp.
v. United States, 381 F.2d 399, 403 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (charitable contribution); Mont-
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the taxpayer is shielded from realizing discharge of indebtedness in-

come to the extent that the deductions of non-principal indebtedness,
such as rent, royalties, salaries, or interest, which can be accrued and

deducted by the debtor as ordinary and necessary business expenses,

did not reduce taxes. 75 This exception produces the same tax treat-

ment regardless of whether the non-principal debt is paid in full or in
part, despite the receipt of differing untaxed economic benefits.

Despite the absence of a tax benefit from deducting the debt expense,
when the non-principal debt is not paid in full, the taxpayer receives
an economic benefit from the borrowing and should realize discharge
77

of indebtedness income.

C. Purchase Money Obligation
Courts have found that the compromise reduction of a purchase

money obligation is a purchase price adjustment, and have required
the debtor to reduce the basis of the purchased property rather than

recognize discharge of indebtedness income. 78 Although Congress has

gomery v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 511, 520 (1975) (casualty loss). Courts recently
have held that the tax benefit rule overrides the exclusionary rules of I.R.C. § 337.
Connery v. United States, 460 F.2d 1130, 1132-33 (3d Cir. 1972); Spitalny v. United
States, 430 F.2d 195, 197-98 (9th Cir. 1970); Commissioner v. Anders, 414 F.2d
1283, 1287-88 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 958 (1969); Anders v. United States,
462 F.2d 1147, 1148-49 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Estate of
Munter v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 663, 674-77 (1975). But see Commissioner v.
South Lake Farms, Inc., 324 F.2d 837, 83840 (9th Cir. 1963) (inapplicable in § 336
liquidations). The Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-589, § 2(c), 94 Stat.
3396 (1980) (codified at I.R.C. § 111(d)), provides that deductions that increase an
unexpired carryover are considered to have produced a tax benefit. I.R.C. § 111(d).
Because most non-principal debts wil increase some carryover which has not yet
expired, the rule of excluding discharge of indebtedness income merely because the
debt had not reduced taxes will arise only infrequently.
75. See I.R.C. § 162(a); see, e.g., Retail Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 23
T.C.M. (CCH) 1463, 1474-75 (1964); Warner Co. v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 419,
430 (1948), af'd per curiam, 181 F.2d 599 (3d Cir. 1950); Rev. Rul. 67-200, 1967-1
C.B. 15, clarified, Rev. Rul. 70-406, 1970-2 C.B. 16. Although principal indebtedness may indirectly generate depreciation deductions or other types of deductions, no
inquiry is made to determine whether these deductions have or have not generated
tax benefits. See Bittker & Thompson, supra note 2, at 1181.
76. See Wright, supra note 10, at 673. The economic benefit would be in the
form of services or the use of property or money rather than the receipt of borrowed
funds. Eustice, supra note 10, at 253.
77. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
78. Commissioner v. Sherman, 135 F.2d 68, 70 (6th Cir. 1943); Helvering v.
A.L. Killian Co., 128 F.2d 433, 434-35 (8th Cir. 1942); Hirsh v. Commissioner, 115
F.2d 656, 658 (7th Cir. 1940); Gehring Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, I T.C. 345,
353-54 (1942), acq. 1943-1 C.B. 9; Pinkney Packing Co. v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A.
823, 829-30 (1940), acq. 1941-1 C.B. 8; see Hextell v. Huston, 28 F. Supp. 521, 523
(S.D. Iowa 1939).
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adopted this special treatment for purchase money obligations as a

part of an objective test to resolve whether a particular debt reduction
should result in discharge of indebtedness income or a price adjust-

ment, 79 it has confined the treatment of reductions to discharges of the
debt of the solvent buyer by the original seller. 80 Nevertheless, even

this limited application of the rule produces inconsistent results.

79. Senate Report, supra note 11, at 16, reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 11,343-44. Additionally, courts have refused to adjust basis if, after the
debt reduction, the fair market value of the property exceeds the debt. Montgomery
v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 511, 521 (1975); Blattner, supra note 61, at 252; Wilson,
Taxation of Debt Collection and Cancellation, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 623, 642 (1960);
Wright, supra note 10, at 677; see Commissioner v. Coastwise Transp. Corp., 71
F.2d 104, 106 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 595 (1934); L.D. Coddon & Bros. v.
Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 393, 398-99 (1938). This distinction is fallacious and
should be rejected. See Surrey, supra note 35, at 1169; Wright, supra note 10, at
678-79. Whether the value declines one dollar below the debt is of little consequence.
The distinction results in realization of discharge of indebtedness income If the
property value falls to one dollar above the debt and adjustment of purchase price If
it falls to the debt or below. Congressional intent to establish an objective test
supports rejection of this distinction. See Senate Report, supra note 11, at 16,
reprintedin 1981 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 11,343-44. Additionally, the Tax
Court has suggested that price adjustment does not apply when the debt reduction
amount exceeds the adjusted basis of the property due to depreciation deductions.
Montgomery v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 511, 522 (1975). In this fact pattern, if the
purchase price adjustment is used, the excess of the debt reduction over the basis of
the property should give rise to either ordinary income under a tax benefit analysis,
see Parker v. Delaney, 186 F.2d 455, 457-59 (1st Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S.
926 (1951); supra note 74; cf. Senate Report, supra note 11, at 20 & n.24, reprinted
in 1981 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 11,347 & n.24 (purchase price adjustment
requires recapture of investment credit), or discharge of indebtedness income under
the economic benefit theory. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text. Both
analyses seem equally appropriate although the tax consequences differ if the excess
reduction is characterized as discharge of indebtedness income and the debtor elects
to reduce bases of other depreciable property. See supra notes 20-29 and accompanying text.
80. Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-589, § 2(a), 94 Stat. 3393 (1980)
(codified at I.R.C. § 108(e)(5)); Senate Report, supra note 11, at 16, reprinted in
1981 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 11,343-44. For example, the rule does not
apply to a mortgage debt placed on the property after purchase. Id.; see Edwards v.
Commissioner, 19 T.C. 275, 281 (1952), acq. 1953-1 C.B. 4. Contra Hirsch v.
Commissioner, 115 F.2d 656, 658 (7th Cir. 1940). The reduction must result from
direct negotiation between buyer and seller, not from an unrelated cause such as the
running of the statute of limitations. Senate Report, supra note 11, at 16-17, reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 11,343-44; see, e.g., Fifth AvenueFourteenth St. Corp. v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 453, 456-57 (2d Cir. 1945); Commissioner v. Coastwise Transp. Corp., 71 F.2d 104, 105-06 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
293 U.S. 595 (1934). A purchase price adjustment is a disposition under the investment credit rules of the Code. Senate Report, supra note 11, at 20 n.24, reprinted in
1981 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 11,347 n.24. In contrast, a basis reduction is
not a disposition. See supra note 28.
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Superficially, the purchase price adjustment has the same effect as
discharge of qualified business indebtedness; 81 more gain, or less loss,
will be realized when the property is sold or exchanged, and if the
purchased property is depreciable, deductions for depreciation will
decrease.82 Purchase price adjustment may, however, have more
beneficial tax consequences. A purchase price adjustment need not
involve depreciable property, as is required for discharges of qualified
business indebtedness. 83 Also, individual taxpayers can utilize the
purchase price adjustment for property not used in their trade or
business.8 4 Lastly, the reduction in basis because of a discharge of
qualified business indebtedness must be recaptured as ordinary income if there is a gain on disposition; whereas a purchase price
adjustment results in capital gain. 5
Because the compromise reduction is often essentially a discharge,
the question arises whether the exception is justified. If the value of
the property was overstated at the time that the purchase money
obligation arose, no discharge of indebtedness income should be realized under the economic benefit theory because the debtor has not
received an unpaid for economic benefit.88 The purchase price adjustment would be appropriate in such a case because the reduction of
the purchase price would merely correct the originally overstated
value. The adjustment, however, has also been applied when the
debtor received an initial economic benefit that was never paid for, as
when the creditor reduced the purchase money obligation because the
market value of the property declined after purchase. 87 The rationale
is that because the debtor suffers an overall loss due to a subsequent
decline in the value of the property, no discharge of indebtedness
income is realized. 8 As has been discussed, this overall loss theory is
of dubious validity. 89 Under the economic benefit theory, only the
value of the property received for the debt-the untaxed economic

81. See supra note 21.
82. See supra note 28.
83. See I.R.C. § 108(c)(1)(A), (e)(5); supra note 21.
84. See I.R.C. § 108(d)(4), (e)(5).
85. See id. §§ 1017(d), 1221, 1222, 1231.
86. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text. The economic benefit theory
compares the value of the original untaxed economic benefit with the amount eventually paid for the benefit. See id. Subsequent revaluation of the purchased property
merely values the initial untaxed benefit correctly.
87. See cases cited supra note 78.
88. See Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170, 172-75 (1926); Commissioner v. Sherman, 135 F.2d 68, 70 (6th Cir. 1943); Helvering v. A.L. Killian Co.,
128 F.2d 433, 435 (8th Cir. 1942); Hextell v. Huston, 28 F. Supp. 521, 522-23 (S.D.
Iowa 1939); Bittker & Thompson, supra note 2, at 1170 & n.35; Stone, supra note 8,
at 556.
89. See supra notes 49-58 and accompanying text.
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benefit as of the time of borrowing-and the amount paid for the
discharge are relevant. Subsequent declines in the value of the economic benefit are not considered. 0 Although Congress has allowed
the use of the purchase price adjustment, albeit in limited circumstances, 9 ' to foster certainty in tax administration, 2 such adjustment
may permit the unwarranted avoidance of tax."3 Elimination of the
use of the adjustment would provide the same certainty and result in
more consistent tax treatment.
III.

TYPE OF CONSIDERATION TRANSFERRED

The nature of the consideration transferred to discharge debt has
affected whether discharge of indebtedness income is realized. A
debtor may transfer property or perform services rather than transfer
money to discharge part or all of the debt. Under the economic
benefit theory, however, the consideration transferred by the debtor
to discharge
the debt is not a factor with respect to whether income is
94
realized.
A. Stock for Debt
1. Principal Debt
Traditionally, a corporate debtor does not realize taxable income
when it issues stock in exchange for debt, even though the stock may
be worth less than the debt. 95 This rule, created by courts and
accepted by the Commissioner, was codified in new section 108.1 o In
90. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text. Furthermore, such use of the
purchase price adjustment has necessitated the administrative inconvenience of considering what happens to property after purchase. See Discharge of Indebtedness,
supra note 52, at 987-88.
91. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
92. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
93. Under the rule as codified by Congress, see supra note 80, a debtor and
creditor are able to have transactions that are essentially equivalent to discharges of
indebtedness treated as price adjustments.
94. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text. The Code should determine
how this income will be taxed or whether it will be excluded from all tax consequences.
95. Commissioner v. Capento See. Corp., 140 F.2d 382, 385-86 (lst Cir. 1944);
Rev. Rul. 59-222, 1959-1 C.B. 80, 82; see Tower Bldg. Corp. v. Commissioner, 6
T.C. 125, 134-35 (1946), acq. 1947-1 C.B. 4 (nonacq. withdrawn); I.R.C.
§ 108(e)(8). The Commissioner reasons that a stock for debt transaction is a mere
change from a fixed indebtedness to a capital stock liability. Rev. Rul. 59-222, 1959-1
C.B. 80, 82; see Eustice, supra note 10, at 238. Stock is not debt, however, Eyster v.
Centennial Bd. of Fin., 94 U.S. 500, 502 (1876); Claridge Apartments Co. v. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 1943), rev'd on other grounds, 323 U.S. 141
(1944), and this rationale is suspect. Cf. Twin Ports Bridge Co. v. Commissioner, 27
B.T.A. 346, 355, 357 (1932) (taxpayer realized discharge of indebtedness income
from the transfer of stock of another corporation for its debt).
96. See I.R.C. § 108(e)(8); Senate Report, supra note 11, at 11, reprintedin 1981
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 11,338.

1981]

DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS

121

amending this section, Congress sought to encourage reorganization,
rather than liquidation, of financially distressed companies.

though this policy is

commendable, 8

7

Al-

section 108 does not adequately

implement it. For example, stock for debt transfers that do not involve

financially distressed companies seemingly are eligible to receive this
preferential treatment. 9 In addition, reorganizations such as debt
for debt transfers, which may involve financially distressed companies, are not expressly covered by section 108, and thus, may cause
discharge of indebtedness income to be realized.' 00 To implement the
legislative intent, courts should construe the statute so as to apply the

rule only to financially distressed companies and to any form of
reorganization. 10' Financially sound companies should realize discharge of indebtedness income,'02 which should be taxed under the
general rules of sections 61 and 108.103
97. Senate Report, supra note 11, at 11, reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 11,338. The House, however, would have eliminated the stock for debt
rule. Id. This rule does not apply if only nominal or token shares of stock are issued to
discharge the debt. I.R.C. § 108(e)(8)(A). This determination is factual and turns on
whether the creditor receives an equity interest in the corporation after the discharge. Senate Report, supra note 11, at 17, reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 11,344. When discharged for stock and other property, the debt is
considered satisfied first by the other property and then by the stock. Id. Finally,
deductions taken because of the debt, such as a bad debt deduction, are subject to
recapture under § 1245. I.R.C. § 108(e)(7)(A); Senate Report, supra note 11, at 18,
reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 11,345.
98. As was said earlier, policy considerations should influence how realized
income is taxed-not whether, in fact, income is realized. The result is identical,
however, whether income is held not to be realized or, for policy reasons, is excluded
from all tax consequences. Because income should be realized under the economic
benefit theory if the stock transferred is worth less than the liability, the stock for
debt rule is more correctly understood to exclude from tax consequences income that
is realized.
99. The exclusion provisions of § 108 are not expressly limited to financially
distressed debtors. See I.R.C. § 108(e)(8).
100. See Commissioner v. Stanley Co. of Am., 185 F.2d 979, 981 (2d Cir. 1951):
Commissioner v. Coastwise Transp. Corp., 71 F.2d 104, 105-06 (lst Cir.), cert.
denied, 293 U.S. 595 (1934); Rev. Rul. 77-437, 1977-2 C.B. 28; Eustice, supra note
10, at 241. Ancillary changes in the terms of indebtedness, such as extension of
maturity or reduction of interest rate, do not constitute a discharge, and thus, no
income is realized. See Rev. Rul. 58-546, 1958-2 C.B. 143. Where the difference
between the value of the exchanged debts is small, however, courts have characterized the difference as a premium on issuance of the new debt. Great W. Power Co. v.
Commissioner, 297 U.S. 543, 54647 (1936); Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Early, 52
F. Supp. 835, 837 (E.D. Va. 1943); Eustice, supra note 10, at 241; Stone, supra note
8, at 562. This distinction is significant because premium on debt is prorated or
amortized over the life of the debt, Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12 (c)(2), T.D. 6984, 1969-1
C.B. 38, while discharge of indebtedness income is immediately subject to § 108
treatment. See I.R.C. § 108 (a)(1).
101. See Senate Report, supra note 11, at 11, reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News at 11,338.
102. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 18-29 and accompanying text.
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2. Interest
When debt is discharged in return for stock, interest accrued on the

debt should be considered separately from the debt. Prior to the Act,
the discharged interest in a reorganization was treated as part of the

discharged debt and was not taxed to either the debtor or creditor. 04
Under the Act,' 05 however, a cash basis creditor who exchanges securities in a Code reorganization, including stock for debt recapitalizations, 0 6 realizes interest income to the extent of the stock received for

the accrued unpaid interest.107 The Act does not address the tax
consequences to the debtor. The question is, therefore, whether the
bifurcation of principal and accrued interest for assessing the tax
consequences to the creditor should be similarly applied to the debtor
for discharge of indebtedness income purposes.

Although the income realized on the discharge of the principal is

excluded from tax consequences because of the stock for debt rule,'0 8

the income realized from the discharge of interest is not similarly
excluded. Thus, the debtor may realize discharge of indebtedness

income on the discharge of accrued interest. Allocation of stock to
accrued interest in a stock for debt discharge can be designated in the
plan of reorganization. 0 9 If no designation is made, the stock may be
allocated between the principal and interest on a pro rata basis, or

stock may be deemed transferred first to discharge the interest, as it is
for the creditor.1 0

104. See Commissioner v. Carman, 189 F.2d 363, 364-65 (2d Cir. 1951); Rev.
Rul. 59-98, 1959-1 C.B. 76, 76-77.
105. Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-589, § 4(e)(1), 94 Stat. 3403
(1980) (codified at I.R.C. § 354(a)(2)(B), (a)(3)(B)).
106. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(E); B. Bittker & J. Eustice, Federal Income Taxation
of Corporations and Shareholders 14.17, at 14-76 to -77 (abr. 4th ed. 1979). A
discharge of a corporation's bonds for preferred stock is a recapitilzation. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.368-2(e)(1) (1955). The reorganization also must have a business purpose. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935).
107. Senate Report, supra note 11, at 34, reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 11,361; see I.R.C. § 354(a)(2)(B), (a)(3)(B). Prior to the Act, courts
uniformly held that stock transferred was not received in exchange for accrued
interest. E.g., Tandy Corp. v. United States, 626 F.2d 1186, 1193-95 (5th Cir. 1980);
Columbia Gas Sys. v. United States, 473 F.2d 1244, 1247-50 (2d Cir. 1973); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. United States, 434 F.2d 1357, 1361 (Ct. Cl. 1970); Scott Paper
Co. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 137, 163-64 (1980).
108. I.R.C. § 108(e)(8), see supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
109. See Senate Report, supra note 11, at 38, reprintedin 1981 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News at 11,364 (indicating that the Act is intended to abrogate the rule in
Commissioner v. Carman, 189 F.2d 363 (2d Cir. 1951)). In Carman, the Second
Circuit deemed irrelevant a designation by the debtor that stock was transferred to
discharge accrued interest. 189 F.2d at 364.
110. See Senate Report, supra note 11, at 34, 38, reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News at 11,360, 11,364.
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Regardless of the method of allocation, if the fair market value of
the stock"' allocated to discharge the accrued interest is less than the
amount of the interest, the debtor should realize discharge of indebtedness income under the economic benefit theory. 2 The Second
Circuit1 3 has held that where no allocation was made, none of the
stock transferred was attributable to the discharge of interest, and
therefore, the debtor realized discharge of indebtedness income in the
amount of the discharged interest." 4 The argument might be raised
that forcing the debtor to realize discharge of indebtedness income is
inconsistent with the congressional policy of encouraging reorganizations." 5 Congress has specifically decided, however, that the creditor
must realize income to the extent stock is transferred to pay the
interest." 6 Because it is the creditor who must approve the discharge,
it is not a deterrence to a reorganization that, in lieu of the creditor
realizing interest income, the debtor realize some discharge of indebtedness income.
B. Propertyfor Debt
The transfer of property to discharge debt is another instance in
which the nature of the consideration for the discharge of indebtedness affects the tax consequences. Courts generally treat such a transfer as a sale or exchange of property, and measure the gain as the
excess of the value of the debt over the adjusted basis of the property." 7 No distinction is made between gain attributable to appreci111. Admittedly, determining the fair market value of stock that is being issued
may pose a measurement problem. See supra note 41. Nevertheless, such a measurement is congressionally mandated when an unsecured creditor receives stock in a
"'workout." Senate Report, supra note 11, at 17, reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News at 11,344; see I.R.C. § 108(e)(8)(B).
112. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text. The reorganization provisions
of the Code do not exclude discharge of indebtedness income to the corporation. See
I.R.C. §354(a); Eustice, supra note 10, at 238.
113. Columbia Gas Sys. v. United States, 473 F.2d 1244 (2d Cir. 1973).
114. Id. at 1247-50. The stock for debt and accrued interest transfer was not a
Code reorganization, id. at 1246, but this would not appear to be significant.
115. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
117. See Commissioner v. Mesta, 123 F.2d 986, 988 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied,
316 U.S. 695 (1942); Kenan v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 217, 219-20 (2d Cir. 1940);
Peninsula Properties Co. v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 84, 91-92 (1942), acq. 1942-2
C.B. 14. But see Turney's Estate v. Commissioner, 126 F.2d 712, 713 (5th Cir. 1942)
(treated as a discharge of indebtedness). Similarly, if a secured nonrecourse debt that
is also a purchase money obligation is foreclosed or transferred to the creditor, courts
hold that the debtor realizes a gain or loss from a sale or exchange rather than
discharge of indebtedness. See Electro-Chemical Engraving Co. v. Commissioner,
311 U.S. 513, 514 (1941); Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504, 510 (1941); Commissioner v. Fortee Properties, 211 F.2d 915, 916 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 826
(1954); R. O'Dell & Sons v. Commissioner, 169 F.2d 247, 248 (3d Cir. 1948); Estate
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ated property and gain from the discharge of indebtedness." 8 If the
fair market value of the property transferred differs from the value of
the debt, however, gain from the sale or exchange of the property
should only equal the excess of its fair market value over adjusted
basis, and under the economic benefit theory, discharge of indebtedness income should equal the excess of the amount due on the debt
over fair market value of the property, the actual amount paid to
discharge the debt."'
Although the taxable income is, in some circumstances, characterized incorrectly without bifurcation of the gain, the Commissioner
seems content with the courts' formulation. 120 Proper characterization of this gain, however, is important. Only gains realized from a
sale or exchange should be outside the reach of section 108 or ordinary
income treatment. 21 Without bifurcation,' 2 2 the intent of Congress
to provide special tax treatment for discharge of indebtedness in-

of Delman v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 15, 39 (1979); Mendham Corp. v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 320, 323-25 (1947); Lutz & Schramm Co. v. Commissioner, 1 T.C.
682, 688-89 (1943), nonacq. 1943-1 C.B. 35.
118. See Bittker & Thompson, supra note 2, at 1172-73; Stone, supra note 8, at
571; Discharge of Indebtedness, supra note 52, at 992.
119. Bittker & Thompson, supra note 2, at 1172-73; Stone, supra note 8, at 571;
Dischargeof Indebtedness, supra note 52, at 992-93; see Treas. Reg. § 1.1017-1(a)(5)
(1956) (difference between obligation discharged and property transferred can reduce basis); Eustice, supra note 10, at 234; supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
When the debtor was insolvent, courts ignored sale or exchange treatment and
applied the insolvency exception. See, e.g., Dallas Transfer & Terminal Warehouse
Co. v. Commissioner, 70 F.2d 95, 96 (5th Cir. 1934); Main Properties, Inc. v,
Commissioner, 4 T.C. 364, 383-85 (1944), acq. 1945-1 C.B. 5. For a discussion of the
insolvency exception, see supra note 10. The Tax Court has refused to bifurcate gain
from a property for debt discharge, Lutz & Schramm Co. v. Commissioner, 1 T.C,
682, 689 (1943), nonacq. 1943-1 C.B. 35; Peninsula Properties Co. v. Commissioner,
47 B.T.A. 84, 91-92 (1942), acq. 1942-2 C.B. 14; but cf. United States v. Davis, 370
U.S. 65, 71-74 (1962) (gain or loss when property is transferred to satisfy marital
rights is the difference between fair market value and the adjusted basis of the
property), but may be ready to change its position. See Danenberg v. Commissioner,
73 T.C. 370, 381-82, 386-88 (1979). The Tax Court held that the debtor realized a
gain from a sale or exchange and that, but for the insolvency exclusion, the debtor
would have realized discharge of indebtedness income. Id. at 386-89. Danenberg is
not directly on point because the property was deemed to have been sold for cash just
prior to the debt discharge and the cash was deemed to have discharged the debt. Id.
at 382. Nevertheless, the Tax Court pointed out that a property for debt discharge
involves a separate tax issue when the fair market value of the property transferred is
less than the amount of the debt discharged. Id. at 381.
120. See Rev. Rul. 76-111, 1976-1 C.B. 214, 215 (discharged indebtedness treated
as gain from the sale or exchange; fair market value disregarded).
121. See Spartan Petroleum Co. v. United States, 437 F. Supp. 733, 737 (D.S.C.
1977); Estate of Delman v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 15, 39 (1979).
122. This Note does not weigh the administrative inconvenience of establishing
the fair market value of property, and recognizes that bifurcation may pose such
practical problems. See supra note 41.
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come 2 3 is frustrated by allowing sale
or exchange tax treatment for
24
discharge of indebtedness income.
C. Services for Debt

If a debtor renders services to discharge a debt, the debtor realizes
compensation income in the amount of the debt discharged.'2 Here,
as with property, the fair market value of the services is ignored.
Ordinary income should be limited to the fair market value of the
services1 26 and be immediately recognized. 12 7 The excess of the debt

amount over the fair market value of the services should be discharge
of indebtedness
income subject to the favorable section 108 tax treat28
ment.1

IV. GiFtS

AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO CAPITAL

The intention of the creditor in discharging a debt can affect tax
consequences. If the discharge of indebtedness can be characterized as
a gift, 129 income realized under the economic benefit theory, which
would be subject to section 108 tax treatment, will be excluded from
gross income under section 102.130

123. Senate Report, supra note 11, at 10-11, reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 11,337-38.
124. The tax consequences of discharge of indebtedness income, see supra notes
18-29 and accompanying text, differ from the tax consequences of a sale or exchange.
Spartan Petroleum Co. v. United States, 437 F. Supp. 733, 737 (D.S.C. 1977); Estate
of Delman v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 15, 39 (1979); see Bialock v. Commissioner, 35
T.C. 649, 660-62 (1961), acq. 1961-2 C.B. 4.
125. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12a (1957); see Rev. Rul. 68-507, 1968-2 C.B. 485, 486.
126. Here again there may be some administrative inconvenience in determining
the fair market value of the services. See supra note 41.
127. See I.R.C. § 61 (a)(1).
128. See supra notes 18-29, 35-39 and accompanying text.
129. I.R.C. § 102(a). The intent of the donor is determinative, in that the gift
must proceed from "'detached and disinterested generosity,' . . . 'out of affection,
respect, admiration, charity or like impulses."' Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363
U.S. 278, 285 (1960) (quoting Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246 (1956), and
Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711, 714 (1952)); accord Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34, 43 (1937). Whether donative intent is present is a factual
question. Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 51 (1949). Prior to Jacobson, a
transaction was a gift if gratuitous, that is, "something... for nothing." Helvering
v. American Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322, 331 (1943). Even purely business or selfish
motives were deemed irrelevant. Id.; see, e.g., Shellabarger Grain Prods. Co. v.
Commissioner, 146 F.2d 177, 185 (7th Cir. 1944); George Hall Corp. v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 146, 146-47 (1943), nonacq. 1972-1 C.B. 3 (acq. withdrawn). Although never expressly overruled, this analysis is largely moribund. Bittker &
Thompson, supra note 2, at 1178; Wilson, supra note 79, at 637-38.
130. See Helvering v. American Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322, 330-31 (1943); cases
cited supra note 129.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

Under the Act, a discharge of indebtedness is never a gift when in a
commercial context.131 It may, nevertheless, be a contribution to
capital. A contribution to capital is excluded from gross income under
section 118.132 Prior to the Act, however, courts split on whether
cancellation by a minority, cash basis stockholder 3 3 of non-principal
debt that had given rise to a tax benefit to the debtor 134 was a tax-free
contribution to capital. 35 Non-principal debt, such as wages, would
131. Senate Report, supra note 11, at 19 n.22, reprintedin 1981 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News at 11,346 n.22. Before this clear indication of congressional intent,
courts generally rejected gift analysis in a commercial setting. See Commissioner v.
Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 38-40 (1949) (repurchase of bonds); Capitol Coal Corp. v.
Commissioner, 250 F.2d 361, 363 (2d Cir. 1957) (corporate settlement), cert. denied,
356 U.S. 936 (1958); Denman Tire & Rubber Co. v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 261,
263 (6th Cir. 1951) (compromise of tax claims); Spear Box Co. v. Commissioner, 182
F.2d 844, 846 (2d Cir. 1950) (repurchase of bonds); Pacific Magnesium, Inc. v.
Westover, 86 F. Supp. 644, 648-49 (S.D. Cal. 1949) (cancellation of corporate debt),
aff'd per curiam, 183 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1950); Securities Co. v. United States, 85 F.
Supp. 532, 532-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (allowing statute of limitations to run); Marshall
Drug Co. v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 820, 821-22 (Ct. Cl.) (cancellation by trade
creditors), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 948 (1951); Arlington Metal Indus. v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 302, 305-07 (1971) (cancellation of corporate debts); Dosek v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 688, 689-90 (1971) (debt for property transfer); Standard Brass & Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 371, 375-76 (1953) (contract
settlement), af'd per curiam, 218 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1955); 1180 East 63rd St. Bldg.
Corp. v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 437, 445-46 (1949) (compromise of tax claims). But
see Reynolds v. Boos, 188 F.2d 322, 326 (8th Cir. 1951) (cancellation of back rent);
Clem v. Campbell, 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9786, at 86,158 (N.D. Tex. 1962) (cancellation of employee's debt); Bosse v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 1772, 1776-77
(1970) (same); Capitol Coal Corp. v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 1183, 1193 (1956) (debt
cancelled by relative of insider), aff'd, 250 F.2d 361 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356
U.S. 936 (1958).
132. I.R.C.§ 118(a), (b)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12(a) (1957); e.g., United States v.
Oregon-Washington R.R. & Nay. Co., 251 F. 211, 213 (2d Cir. 1918); Lawrence v.
Commissioner, 13 B.T.A. 463, 466-67, (1928), acq. 8-1 C.B. 26 (1929); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.61-12(a) (1957); see Helvering v. Jane Holding Corp., 109 F.2d 933, 938-39 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 653 (1940). But see Briarcliff Inv. Co. v. Commissioner,
90 F.2d 330, 331 (5th Cir.) (shareholder's purchases in open market attributed to
corporation), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 731 (1937).
133. A corporation cannot deduct expenses to a cash basis, greater than 50%
shareholder if, within two and one-half months after the corporation's taxable year,
the expenses have not been paid. I.R.C. § 267(a)(2), (b).
134. Because principal indebtedness cannot be deducted as an ordinary and necessary business expense under § 162(a), only non-principal indebtedness such as interest, wages, rents or royalties which can be deducted as an ordinary and necessary
business expense under § 162(a) produce a tax benefit problem. See cases cited infra
note 135; I.R.C. § 111; supra note 75.
135. Three positions have been taken. The Eighth Circuit and the Commissioner
maintained that this fact pattern gave rise to income to the corporation under the tax
benefit rule. Helvering v. Jane Holding Corp., 109 F.2d 933, 941-42 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 310 U.S. 653 (1940); Rev. Rul. 76-316, 1976-2 C.B. 22, superceding Rev.
Rul. 73-432, 1973-2 C.B. 17; Byrne, The Tax Benefit Rule as Applied to Corporate
Liquidations and Contributionsto Capital: Recent Developments, 56 Notre Dame
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be ordinary income to the cash basis shareholder when received.13 In
this limited factual circumstance, the shareholder, by forgiving the

debt, could avoid reporting the debt as income while the corporation
could deduct the wages and thereby reduce taxable income.137

To

eliminate this result, Congress requires the corporation to realize
discharge of indebtedness income when the discharged debt exceeds
the shareholder's basis in the debt. 138

Law., 215, 245 (1980); Surrey, supra note 35, at 1176-77, Warren & Sugarman,
supra note 43, at 1348-49, 1358-69; see Putoma Corp. v. Commissioner, 601 F.2d
734, 751-54 (5th Cir. 1979) (Rubin, J., dissenting in part). A second view is that the
forgiveness is tax-free. Carroll-McCreary Co. v. Commissioner, 124 F.2d 303, 305
(2d Cir. 1941) (forgiveness of salaries); Commissioner v. Auto Strop Safety Razor
Co., 74 F.2d 226, 226-27 (2d Cir. 1934) (forgiveness of royalties and interest);
Putoma Corp. v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 652, 666-67 (1976) (same), alf'd, 601 F.2d
734 (5th Cir. 1979); Hartland Assocs. v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1580, 15S5-86
(1970) (same), nonacq. 1976-2 C.B. 3; Midland Tailors v. Commissioner, 2 T.C.M.
(CCH) 281, 284 (1943) (forgiveness of salary); Tanner Mfg. v. Commissioner, 2
T.C.M. (CCH) 305, 307 (1943) (same). The third view is to assign the income to the
shareholder. Dwyer v. United States, 622 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1980); Commissioner v. Fender Sales, Inc., 338 F.2d 924, 928-29 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 813 (1965), acq. Rev. Rul. 67-402, 1967-2 C.B. 135; Bittker & Thompson, supra
note 2, at 1181. In Fender Sales, the Ninth Circuit held that two 50": shareholders
realized income under the assignment of income doctrine when the corporation
issued stock in exchange for unpaid salaries. 338 F.2d at 928-29. The Tax Court in
Putoma, a case factually similar to Fender with the exception that no stock was
issued to the two 50% shareholders in return for the cancellation of salary and
interest indebtedness, held that the assignment of income doctrine should not apply
because there were such doubts concerning the collectibility of the indebtedness in
view of the financial condition of the corporation that the creditors could not be said
to have had "dominion and control" over it. 66 T.C. 652, 670 (1976), afJ'd, 601 F.2d
734 (5th Cir. 1979). The assignment of income doctrine is based on the principle that
when the taxpayer "has fully enjoyed the benefit of the economic gain represented by
his right to receive income, [he] can [not] escape taxation because he has not himself
received payment of it from his obligor." Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 116
(1940). Furthermore, the Court in Horst said: "[I]ncome is 'realized' by the assignor
because he, who owns or controls the source of the income, also controls the disposition of that which he could have received himself and diverts the payment from
himself to others as the means of procuring the satisfaction of his wants." 311 U.S. at
116-17. Therefore, it can be argued that the shareholder can be regarded as having
assigned his income to the corporation as the means of procuring the satisfaction of
his wants, and should realize taxable income in the amount assigned.
136. See I.R.C. § 451(a).
137. Commissioner v. Fender Sales, Inc., 338 F.2d 924, 930 (9th Cir. 1964)
(Barnes, J., dissenting), cert. denied. 382 U.S. 813 (1965), acq. Rev. Rul. 67-402,
1967-2 C.B. 135; Putoma Corp. v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 652, 675 (1976) (Simpson, J., dissenting in part), aff'd, 601 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1979); Eustice, supra note
10, at 250-51; Warren & Sugarman, supra note 43, at 1348. A cash basis shareholder
does not realize income when a non-principal debt is forgiven. See I.R.C. § 451(a).
An accrual basis shareholder would realize income if the debt is forgiven after the
shareholder has accrued the income. See Treas. Reg. § 1.451-1(a) (1957).
138. Senate Report, supra note 11, at 18 n.21, reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News at 11,345 n.21; see I.R.C. § 108(e)(6). This rule applies only when the
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There are two possible policies underlying this rule, one focusing on
the tax benefit to the corporation, 3 and the second focusing on the
avoidance of income by the shareholder.140 Neither one is adequately
implemented by section 108. If Congress intended the corporation to
realize income because it previously had benefited from the expense
that gave rise to the debt,' 4 1 then the section fails because the provision includes all non-principal debt, even when the corporation had42
no taxable income and had therefore received no prior tax benefit.
Similarly, the corporation realizes discharge of indebtedness income
even if the expense was a nondeductible capital expenditure. 143
If Congress intended the corporation to realize income because the
shareholder has not previously reported the contributed debt as income, 44 the section also fails. If both the debtor and creditor are cash
basis taxpayers, and if the forgiven debt would have been deductible
when paid, there is a provision in section 108 that excuses the corporation from having to realize income.145 This is the correct result only if
the tax benefit doctrine underlies congressional intent. It does not,
however, address the shareholder's avoidance of income. Nevertheless, there is still the possibility of causing the shareholder, in this
limited situation, to realize income on the cancellation
under an
4
unrelated theory, the assignment of income doctrine.1 0
CONCLUSION

Tax law demands consistency. Varying judicial rules that cause
inconsistent tax consequences for similar circumstances frustrate cer-

tainty and engender confusion. Adoption of the economic benefit

shareholder is acting as a shareholder, rather than as a creditor. Senate Report, supra
note 11, at 19 n.22, reprintedin 1981 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 11,346 n.22.
Moreover, the transaction cannot be characterized as a gift. id.; see supra note 131
and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 135.
141. See Senate Report, supra note 11, at 19 & n.22, reprintedin 1981 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News at 11,346 & n.22; supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
142. If a taxpayer does not have income, or his losses and deductions exceed gross
income, a deduction may not reduce taxes.
143. See I.R.C. § 263.
144. Bittker & Thompson, supra note 2, at 1180-81; see Putoma Corp v. Commissioner, 601 F.2d 734, 754 n.4 (5th Cir. 1979) (Rubin, J., dissenting); O'Hare, supra
note 74, at 241, 243; supra note 135.
145. I.R.C. § 108(e)(2).
146. See Dwyer v. United States, 622 F.2d 460, 462-63 (9th Cir. 1980). The
shareholder in Dwyer realized income on the cancellation under the assignment of
income doctrine, even though the corporation had never deducted the non-principal
debt. Id. at 462; see supra note 135.
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theory for discharge of indebtedness income would resolve the inconsistencies inherent in the current melange of judicial rules and promote uniformity in the administration of tax laws. Relief from unduly
burdensome tax consequences will then be provided, as intended,
solely by the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980.
Robert Goebel

